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ERASING THE NON-JUDICIAL NARRATIVE: VICTIM TESTIMONIES AT THE 
KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 
By Mahdev Mohan & Vani Sathisan
1
 
 
“This Tribunal is not about politics, this is about justice.” – Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
International criminal justice is widely regarded as the accepted means to deal with 
mass atrocity. It fortifies and “lends authority and legitimacy to the international realm 
through tribunals, proceedings and juridical language.”2 Various peace agreements concluded 
in the 1990s enshrine the primacy of international justice through individual accountability as 
a catalyst for national stability.
3
 United Nations (“UN”) Security Council Resolution 1329, 
which established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), 
sought to “bring to justice those responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law” and thus contribute to the “restoration and maintenance of peace in the 
region.”4  
To former ICTY President Antonio Cassese, peace and justice go hand-in-hand:  
"Justice is an indispensable ingredient of the process of national reconciliation. It is 
essential to the restoration of peaceful and normal relations between people who have had to 
live under a reign of terror. It breaks the cycle of violence, hatred and extra-judicial 
retribution."
5
  
 
Even as the ICTY prepares to conclude its tasks by 1 July 2013, this formula for 
achieving peace through justice appears to have taken root in the normative discourse of 
                                            
1
 Mahdev Mohan is an Assistant Professor of Law at Singapore Management University. Vani Sathisan is an 
associate at Access to Justice Asia LLP. The research for this article was made possible by a Singapore 
Management University Office of Research Grant. We are grateful for the research assistance of Huang Jieyang, 
and the insightful comments of anonymous reviewers. 
2
 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, War Crimes and Realpolitik: International Justice from World War I to the 21st 
Century, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004: https://www.rienner.com/uploads/47da985f5271e.pdf 
3
 Simon Chesterman, You the People, The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building 
(Project of the International Peace Academy) Human Rights Quarterly - Volume 27, Number 2, May 2005, p. 
159 
4
 Website of the ICTY: http://www.icty.org/sid/320 
5
Antonio Cassese, ICTY Press Release Number 27, 24 November 1995. 
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international justice and has been employed in the founding documents of 
international(ized) courts
6
, including the statute of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”)7.  
On April 17, 1975, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge entered Cambodia’s capital Phnom 
Penh as conquerors.”8 Pol Pot sought to create an ultra-Marxist agrarian utopia and “turned 
back Cambodian clocks to year zero.”9 The Angkar or ‘Organization’, as the revolutionary 
movement named itself, was the sole governing power and the owner of all means of 
production and private property.  
Cambodia was renamed Democratic Kampuchea (DK). There was, however, nothing 
democratic about the regime or its methods. From 1975 to 1979, an estimated 1.7 million 
people were executed or died of overwork, starvation, torture or untreated disease at the 
hands of the Khmer Rouge.
10
 Twenty five years later, the Cambodian government and UN 
agreed to establish the ECCC, a hybrid tribunal that seeks to hold the senior leaders of the 
Khmer Rouge those most responsible for the crimes accountable under law.
11
 According to 
then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the ECCC was meant to symbolize “judicial 
accountability, which alone can provide the basis for peace, reconciliation and 
                                            
6 We use the phrase international(ized) to refer to both purely international ad hoc courts such as the 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) as well as hybrid tribunals, such as the Special Panels of the Dili District 
Court (“SPDC”), the  Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 
7
 For example, in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the hope of the UN Security Council was that a 
“credible system of justice and accountability for the very serious crimes committed there would end impunity 
and would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.” 
– UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000), Preambular Paragraph 6 (August 14, 2000).  
8
 Shanberg, Sydney H, The Death and Life of Dith Pran (New York: Penguin, 1985), p.26.  
9
 Powers, Samantha, A Problem From Hell, America and the Age of Genocide (Perennial Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2002), p. 87.  
10
 See generally David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, (New Haven: Yale University Press. 
1991). 
11
 Please see Statute of the ECCC: 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf 
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development.”12 Reiterating this formula when recommending the establishment of the 
ECCC, the UN General Assembly added that justice would also serve as a “remedy” for 
victims:  
“Accountability of individual perpetrators of grave human rights violations is one of the 
central elements of any effective remedy for victims of human rights violations and a key 
factor in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system and, ultimately, reconciliation and 
stability.”13  
To provide “remedy” to the victims and “reconciliation” to the broader Cambodian 
society through “accountability,” the ECCC’s Internal Rules promised victims an 
unprecedented opportunity to participate in the trials as “Civil parties.”  Purporting to give 
ownership of the trials to survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime, the ECCC has encouraged 
them to participate in its trials as “civil parties,” with the promise that they will now be 
conferred with the power to cross-examine witnesses, have a voice in the proceedings and 
very significantly, be able to request for collective and moral reparations.
14
 Many have hailed 
victim participation as a tool of empowerment and believe that the Tribunal may stand a good 
chance of meeting local expectations because it gives a prominent role to victims in the legal 
process.
15
  
                                            
12
 Preamble, Report of the Group of Experts.  
13
 Preamble, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly – the Khmer Rouge Trials, GA Resolution 
A/RES/57/228, 27, February 2003 [the UN GA Resolution adopting the UN Agreement which created the 
ECCC].  
14
 ECCC Internal Rules, 17 September 2010: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/121/IRv6-
EN.pdf 
15
 James Cockayne, “Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes trials as Unsuccessful Degradation 
Ceremonies” Journal of Human Rights, 4:455, 2005 atp.459. Also, Diane Orentlicher, special counsel of the 
Open Society Justice Initiative, believes that the Tribunal marks the evolution of international criminal justice, 
“recognition, after 15 years of international and hybrid courts like this one, not to exclude victims from the 
justice that is being dispensed on their behalf”, telephone interview with Seth Mydans, “In the Khmer Rouge 
Trials, Victims will not Stand Idle By” New York Times, June 17 2008. 
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Relying on these sentiments, the ECCC’s biggest donors, such as Canada, Japan and the 
European Union, expect the tribunal to usher in “lasting peace and reconciliation”16 and to 
“promote peace, democracy, the rule of law and good governance” in Cambodia.17 However, 
it appears to us that the globalitarian rhetoric of peace through justice promises more than it 
can deliver.  
Yet, peace and justice, we argue, do not always go hand-in-hand; in part, because 
prosecution (justice) is often prioritized over the requirements of reconciliation (peace). 
Although the phrase “transitional justice” is used to refer to both prosecution of war criminals 
and post-conflict capacity building, “it is typically the former that receives the most attention 
and resources.”18 Moreover, at least three tensions plague the prosecution of international 
crimes. They are, first, the tension between the need to focus narrowly upon the person of the 
accused, while simultaneously establishing a wider historical record of past events; second, 
the tension between adhering to the strictures of the legal process, while attending to the 
suffering of individual victims; and, finally, the tension between the need to make harrowing 
past events the focus of the trial, whilst aspiring to contribute to the creation of a more 
hopeful future.
19
   
Our article disputes the frequently asserted – but rarely examined – second claim that 
victim-participants benefit from participating in war crimes trials and may be able to 
reconcile with their traumatic pasts. In particular, our article will consider the ECCC’s first 
                                            
16
 Please refer to: http://www.france24.com/en/20090321-japan-announces-funds-broke-khmer-rouge-tribunal-
cambodia 
17
Please refer to: http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=b4fa6297-d68c-4e4f-bc42-
1e21065f45dd 
18
 Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 56, pp. 331-
361, 2008  
19
 See generally Marie-Benedicte Dembour and Emily Haslam, “Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War 
Crimes Trials,” European Journal of International Law, February 2004.  
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trial (“Case 001”) which concluded in July 2010 after almost a year and a half of 
proceedings.  
We recognize that the ECCC, like other international(ized) criminal tribunals, has its 
limitations in terms of funds and resources and do not seek to freight the Tribunal with more 
baggage than it ought to withstand. Nevertheless, it is crucial that the ECCC be held to its 
stated promise of “victim empowerment” and of “pursuing internationally accepted principles 
of justice and of national reconciliation,” which have set expectations for justice in Cambodia 
soaring.
20
  
Cambodian victims who came forward to participate in Case 001 were led to believe that 
the Defendant, Kaing Guek Eav, better known by his nom de guerre “Duch”), the 
commandant of S-21 or “Tuol Sleng” prison where close to 17,000 people perished, would be 
brought to book on their terms. However, the gap between the ECCC’s feel-good rhetoric and 
reality; between victims’ desires for vindication and the strictures of legalism are 
significantly wide.  
To claim, as ECCC affiliates do, that catharsis and reconciliation necessarily flow from 
legal accountability is misleading. Drawing upon the seminal work of Judith Shkalr and her  
description of gradations or degrees of legalism, we analyze journalistic and trial monitoring 
reports relating to the experiences of victims before the ECCC in Case 001. Our article would 
certainly have been enriched by empirical research into how civil parties perceived their 
participation in their proceedings and their treatment by the court. However, this is not a 
                                            
20
 The ECCC was established by the UN agreement dated 6 June 2003 and implemented by the ECCC law, 
which entered into force on 27 October 2004. It came into formal existence and began operating on the 3
rd
 of 
July 2006 when judges were sworn in and on the 12 June 2007, the internal rules, upon which its investigations 
and prosecutions were based, were adopted in the plenary meeting of judges. (Mohan, p.284) 
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reason to forestall examination of these issues. This article will, we hope, serve to guide the 
ECCC in how it should modify the trial process and consider ways in which to conceive and 
engage with non-judicial measures outside the court-room which may be more resonant with 
victim civil parties.  
TRAUMA IN THE COURT-ROOM 
Anyone who has suffered from physical, psychological, or material harm as a direct 
consequence of the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979 is 
considered a “victim” and may apply to become a ‘civil party’ to the proceedings at the 
ECCC. Civil parties enjoy rights at trial akin to the prosecution and the defence. The ECCC’s 
civil party process thus derives from a victim-oriented approach to punishment, which 
suggests that a victim needs to tell her story before a judge within the framework of a 
formalized process in order to feel better. In theory, the notion that victims benefit from 
participation is difficult to dispute, but in practice the civil party process leaves much to be 
desired.  
According to Internal Rule 23(1), victims can participate in the proceedings by 
‘supporting the prosecution;’ yet the extent and parameters within to which they are able to 
provide supplementary information to be accepted by the Co-investigating Judges, question 
witnesses or the defendants and add weight to the Co-Prosecutors’ elbow by adducing new 
evidence are not clearly defined. As a result, the court has been vested with a wide ambit of 
discretion when determining the extent to which civil parties should be able to participate.
21
 
In addition, monitors at the Tribunal report that the Court failed to budget for the inclusion of 
a victims’ participation process from the outset of the proceedings and thus has not fully 
                                            
21
 Please see KRT Trial Monitoring Reports: Monitoring Program Update # 22: “Lessons Learned from Duch’s 
Trial”: http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/KRT_monitoring_reports.htm 
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committed itself to meaningfully upholding its promise of active participation to victim civil 
parties.
22
 
These vagaries impinged on the rights of victim civil parties in Case 001. Defence 
lawyer Francois Roux invoked Rule 23(1) to argue that Civil parties merely were there to act 
as a “second prosecutor.” Civil Party lawyers took issue with the watered-down role of the 
victim witnesses, arguing that Civil parties were not participating in the trial only to prove the 
guilt of the Accused but also to express their views and to confront and understand why 
atrocities had occurred. Lawyer for Civil Party Group 1, Alain Werner, argued for a broad 
interpretation of Internal Rule 23(1) as there was no guidance to the Rule defining the 
parameters of “civil party participation.”23   
Civil Party Mr. Chum Mey said that he keenly felt a sense of satisfaction whenever 
the Court responded to his observations or complaints.
24
 Yet, throughout the trial, the court 
increasingly adopted a restrictive approach to civil party participation, paying less and less 
attention to the views of civil parties.
25
 Civil parties were at first not afforded the right to 
make opening statements at the Tribunal. Later, their requests to be allowed to make 
submissions on the defendants’ release from provisional detention as well as to respond to the 
Co-Prosecutor’s opening statements were also both denied.26 By limiting the scope of victim 
                                            
22
 See ‘Table S.2.e: Resource Requirements by Object of Expenditure’ and ‘Table S.2.f: Post Requirements for 
Defence Support Section and Victims Unit’ and paras S.82 – 89 of the budget estimates produced by the ECCC 
in Revised Budget Estimates for 2005 – 2009 (July 2008), available online at: <http://www.unakrt-
online.org/04_documents.htm#Budget>. The tables show that the Court’s original budget did not provide for 
any funding for a victims participation scheme. This has been elucidated in the KRT Trial Monitoring Report: 
Monitoring Program Update # 22. 
23
 Supra note 20. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid.  
26
 Ibid.  
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participation in the trial, the court prompted civil parties to actively boycott the proceedings 
in a silent protest against the Judges’ decisions.27 
On one occasion, the President of the ECCC Trial Chamber, Nil Nonn, told civil parties 
to console themselves and carry on with their evidence because time was of the essence. 
When witnesses broke down and their lawyers asked for more time to help victims compose 
themselves, the President became annoyed, stressing that “the Chamber was already vigilant 
about keeping track of the time used for questions.”28 When Chum Mey broke down several 
times, he was immediately instructed by the President to “compose himself.”29 He went on to 
remind civil parties to gather themselves quickly because details might be forgotten if they 
expressed emotion in the court-room. Clearly, judges were unable to deal with nervous, 
traumatized witnesses who were testifying to their experiences from more than thirty years 
ago. 
This echoes the manner in which victim witnesses were treated in the trial of Radislav 
Krstic in the ICTY, where even though the Court aimed to restore peace and reconciliation, it 
could only legally try the defendant brought before it. It was left to social psychologists and 
historians to plumb the depth of the Srebrenica massacre and probe the deep-seated causes by 
listening to victims’ stories.30 Judges and witnesses talked past each other. It was apparent 
that legal proceedings cannot produce the definitive collective memory of the events with 
which they deal and that there is a need to foster a variety of collective memories outside the 
judicial platform. 
                                            
27
 See “Letter of Civil parties in Case 001 to the President of Trial Chamber;” Interview with Civil Party Chum 
Mei; Interview with Civil Party Chum Neou. 
28
 “Traumatized survivor painted Pol Pot amidst screams for help,” Laura MacDonald, 1 July 2009.  
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Supra note 18.  
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In the interests of time and securing convictions, the victims’ full narrative is pruned and 
then co-opted by the legal process, thereby instrumentalizing individual memory, trauma and 
suffering for the court’s collective end of wanting to fit the legal pieces and establishing 
criminal liability.  
In its decision issued on 9 October 2009, the majority of the Trial Chamber noted that 
Civil parties’ role in trial proceedings did not confer on them ‘a general right of equal 
participation with the Co-Prosecutors.’31 Though previously able to question witnesses and 
the defendants on issues pertaining to their character, civil parties were thereafter robbed of 
the opportunity to fully immerse participate in the proceedings. Delivering a powerful 
dissent, Judge Laverne criticized the Chamber’s decision, noting that it would be difficult to 
achieve reconciliation if victims were deprived of their right to inquire why the crimes had 
been committed against them.
32
 In fact, Expert Witness Dr Chhim Sotheara confirmed that 
victims could hardly overcome their traumatization without identifying “those people behind 
the intangibility.”33  
The judicial endeavour of the ECCC, to maintain a legally authoritative account of 
what happened, crippled the participation of the Civil parties as they are excluded from the 
process of asking questions that are vital in aiding them deal with their post-conflict trauma. 
Several Civil parties were also forced to leave the stand as their identities as victims were 
questioned by the Tribunal. During the testimony of Civil Party Mr Ly Hor, an alleged 
survivor of S-21, inconsistencies in his account led Duch to publicly challenge his identity as 
                                            
31
 Case 001 ECCC Trial Chamber (9 October 2009) Decision, para 25. 
32
 Judge Lavergne’s Dissenting Opinion; see also Dr Chhim Sotheara, Case 001 ECCC Trial Chamber 
‘Transcript of Proceedings’ (25 August 2009), p 20.  
33
 Ibid.  
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a victim.
34
 Such an experience, scholars and trial monitors assert, may “defeat the positive 
outcomes of participation and instead lead to re-traumatization.
35
 Civil party Ly Hor
36
 took 
the stand only to have his oral testimony and credibility come under fire as it deviated 
materially from both his written statement and the written confession purportedly produced at 
S-21 that he insisted was his own.   
 Ly Hor’s lawyers,37 who appeared none the wiser, were unable to offer any 
satisfactory reason for why the ECCC Trial Chamber should nevertheless regard the 
documents as supportive of Ly Hor’s claim.38   “I suppose you would agree with me that this 
civil party has been very poorly prepared for this morning's experience,” was Judge Sylvia 
Cartwright’s admonishment to Ly Hor’s lawyers,39 after a morning of questioning that saw 
Ly Hor become visibly and increasingly distressed.
40
  Also taken to task by the Chamber 
were the lawyers for civil party Nam Mon
41
 for Nam Mon’s belated disclosure of new 
allegations, which were eventually rejected.
42
   
But to Phaok Khan and Nam Mon, the inaccuracy of the written statements was 
peripheral to the fact that Phaok Khan was able to recount his “very interesting” experiences 
                                            
34
 See KRT Trial Monitor, Report No.12 (week ending 9 July): 
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/KRT_monitoring_reports.htm 
35
 Supra note 20. 
36
 Civil party E2/61. 
37
 Ly Hor was represented by lawyers from Civil Party Group 1. 
38
 See Official Transcript of hearing on 6 July 2009 at pages 58 to 59. According to one of Ly Hor’s lawyers, the 
use of an informal instead of official translation resulted in the true purport of his client’s documentation being 
unclear: see Official Transcript of hearing on 6 July 2009 at pages 55 and 58. 
39
 See Official Transcript of hearing on 6 July 2009 at page 55. Ly Hor informed the Trial Chamber that the last 
time he spoke to his lawyers was a month before his Court appearance: see Official Transcript of hearing on 6 
July 2009 at page 54. 
40
 KRT Report Issue No. 12 at page 7.  
41
 Civil party E2/32, who was represented by lawyers from Civil Party Group 2. 
42
 Nam Mon’s new allegations pertained to her alleged rape at S-21. According to Nam Mon’s lawyers, Nam 
Mon had not informed them of these allegations until just before her Court appearance.  Nam Mon’s lawyers 
subsequently filed a written request for these allegations to be put before the Chamber.  This was rejected on the 
ground that the allegations were belated: see Decision on Parties Requests to Put Certain Materials Before the 
Chamber Pursuant to Internal Rule 87(2), E176, 28 October 2009, at para. 14. 
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before the Trial Chamber.
43
  The applications of Ly Hor and Nam Mon were ultimately 
rejected by the Trial Chamber.
44
 By rejecting their non-judicial narrative – those parts of their 
stories which did not comply with the legal and evidential requirements of the court– the 
judges gravely underestimated the cost to survivors of laying bare their personal histories in 
open court, having their stories publicly undermined and his efforts potentially laid to waste.  
The credibility of the civil parties’ testimonies was, in their presence, questioned by the 
Chamber, and more fiercely, by Duch himself
45
, and ultimately, for all intents and purposes, 
discredited. 
Attempting then to create a space for victims in the judicial arena alone is misguided. 
Victims recount their stories of pain and distress to an audience that is more interested in 
seeing how these facts neatly fit evidentiary matrices. In that process, victims’ non-
evidentiary voices, claims and desires for vindication are unfortunately not heard and taken 
into account, but carelessly sidelined and silenced. 
At the start of Case 001, the ECCC announced that victims admitted as civil parties to the 
court may seek collective and moral reparations and that the court will award “any 
appropriate and comparable forms of reparation.”46 On September 17, 2009, the four civil 
party groups in that case made their submission for reparations which included: (1) 
compilation and dissemination of apologetic statements made by Duch, (2) access to free 
medical and psychological care, (3) funding of educational programs to inform the public 
about crimes that took place during the Khmer Rouge regime, (4) erection of memorials to 
                                            
43
 See Official Transcript of hearing on 7 July 2009 at pages 94 to 95. 
44
 Case 001 Judgment at pages 223 to 225. 
45
 For example, with regard to Ly Hor’s testimony, Duch, after bringing the Trial Chamber through certain 
documents, insisted that Ly Hor was wrongly claiming as his own a written confession of a different S-21 
detainee who had already died: see Official Transcript of hearing on 6 July 2009 at pages 83 to 87.  
46
 Please refer to: http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/blog/labels/Civil%20Parties.html 
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commemorate victims, and (6) publication of the names of all the civil parties in the final 
judgment.
47
  
At the conclusion of the trial, however, the only reparation ordered by the judges was the 
compilation and publication of their judgement containing names of the civil parties’ and 
Duch’s apology to his victims. The court eschewed innovative measures to settle instead for 
something unimaginative and expedient and that the court’s preference for “expedience over 
recovery has unsettled many victims.  Furthermore, several civil parties were told on the day 
of the judgment that their status as civil parties was rejected and that they would not stand to 
benefit from any reparations ordered by the Court – indeed these victims were made to feel 
that they were undeserving of even the compilation and publication of the ECCC’s 
judgment.
48
  
Some civil parties we have spoken with have been disillusioned because the court 
process has turned out to be unreceptive to and incompatible with their subjective 
impressions, emotions and renditions of truth. Others who have applied to become civil 
parties but have been told that their applications are inadmissible for jurisdictional reasons – 
for instance, because the crimes they suffered took place outside the court’s temporal 
mandate – have felt affronted because their status and identity as victims has been 
questioned. Still others wish to speak in their own voice in court rather than through their 
lawyers and are distraught when they are compelled to engage legal representation. For its 
part, the ECCC fearing an onslaught of almost 4000 Cambodians who have applied to be 
civil parties in the next case which looks set to begin in June 2011, all jostling for an 
opportunity to address the court, has back-pedalled on several of the rights it originally 
                                            
47
 Ibid.  
48
 Guy De Launey, Tears and Disbelief at Duch’s Verdict, 26 July 2010: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
pacific-10763409 
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conferred to civil parties. In sum, the ECCC’s civil party process promises far more than it 
can deliver.
49
 
TRIAL & ERROR 
The Khmer Rouge’s atrocities have been described as displaying “brutality that would 
make Hitler cringe.”50 Just as Hitler’s Nazi regime was held accountable by the International 
Military tribunal at Nuremburg in 1945, Pol Pot and the DK Foreign Minister, Ieng Sary, 
were tried in abstentia for genocide and other international crimes in 1979 by the so called 
People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (“PRT”) established by the Vietnamese installed Heng 
Samrin administration.
51
   
However, even though foreign lawyers had been invited to serve as prosecutors and 
defence counsel in order to “reflect international standards of justice” and thereby enhance 
the legitimacy of the proceedings, the PRT was not well received by local and international 
stakeholders. The short duration of the trial, the denial of due process rights to the defendants 
who were convicted in abstentia and a poor defence combined to create the impression of 
mob justice. Many Cambodians saw the trial as an assertion of Vietnamese sovereignty over 
Cambodia. The reaction in the West to the verdict was conspicuous silence – all it 
commanded was two square inches in the back pages of the New York Times.  These factors 
created the impression of “primitive political justice” which was seen to be “akin to the 
Stalinist show trials of the 1930s.”52 
Yet, even critics are hard-pressed to offer imaginative non-judicial options when 
examining the ambitions of war crimes trials. Despite surveying modern war crimes 
                                            
49
 Almost 4,000 have applied to be civil parties in Case 002: http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region3/642.html 
50
 “Out of the silence,” The Economist, September 10, 1977, p.131.  
51
 Please refer to: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USCIS,,KHM,,3f52079b4,0.html 
52
Maguire, Peter, Facing death in Cambodia, (Columbia university press), 2005, p. 65.  
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tribunals from the trial of the Bonapartists to the indictment of former Serbian leader 
Slobodan Milosevic, and noting their failed efforts to mete justice and broker peace, 
Jonathan Bass merely concludes that they are better than violent purges or lynching – a 
conclusion we see as foregone:
 
“A well-run legalistic process is superior, both practically and morally, to apathy 
or vengeance. True, the track record of war crimes tribunals so far has not been particularly 
impressive [...] But the track records of other approaches to defeated foes leave even 
more to be desired. The task is to do a tribunal, and to do it properly. If at first you don’t 
succeed, try again”.53 
 
Legalism, Bass suggests, can help subdue the thirst for vengeance and transform it 
into a more cathartic form of being , i.e. reconciliation, “staying,” as Justice Jackson, an 
American prosecutor for the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal famously described it, “the hand 
of vengeance.” But cold-blooded revenge is not the only non-judicial response of survivors 
mass atrocity – by assuming as much legalism may, as Mark Drumbl explains, end up 
“externalizing justice so that it “resonates primarily with certain extraterritorial audiences.”54 
If Cambodians are to retain their place as the main beneficiary of the ECCC and its trials, 
then the court must transcend the rhetoric of accountability and equitable justice to begin a 
new normative discourse tailored to suit domestic circumstances and focuses on restorative 
justice. This discourse must consider, as Jenny Martinez does, that in an international 
criminal tribunal, “accountability and fairness are two strands of justice” that don’t always 
coexist.
55
  
REFUTING THERAPEUTIC LEGALISM 
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For Judith Shklar, the assertion that the law is the ultimate recourse for victims of 
mass atrocity is not a self-evident one, regardless of whether legal justice is championed by 
positivist or natural lawyers. For her, “theories of law [...] have been devised almost 
exclusively by lawyers [...] who agree in nothing but in taking the prevalence of legalism and 
of law for granted.”56  
Legal theorists in both camps, she claims, take for granted the idea of “law as a 
conceptual pattern entirely distinct from all political, moral and social values and 
institutions.”57 Both extol the “thereness” of the law, and adhere to the belief that a “pure 
theory” of law, a purely formalistic and universal conception of a legal system abstracted from 
all the social and political realities in which it is embedded, is not only possible, but indeed 
“necessary”.58  They treat “law as a self-contained system of norms [...] without any reference 
to the content, aim and development of the rules that compose it”59 and insist that the law 
“must be self-regulating, immune from the unpredictable pressures of politicians and 
moralists, [and] manned by a judiciary that at least tries to maintain justice’s celebrated 
blindness.”60   
Yet, as Shklar points out, by privileging formal justice above all contending interests, 
legalism is not the neutral ‘science’61   it claims to be, but is manifestly political; it is a 
calibrated “choice of political values, a choice usually in favour of stability [and] a 
position that is not [...] necessary or self-evident.”62  Formalistically instrumentalized, 
‘justice’ or, as Shklar explains as the so-called “impartial blaming, praising, rewarding and 
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punishment of specific acts” according to consensus is not always blind, but “may be carried 
out for very different ends.
63
 
Seen in this light, ‘justice’, or at least its legalist rendition is, as Thom Ringer notes, “a 
morality masquerading as an impartial science, deeply convinced that its presumed logical 
self-evidence puts itself above the nasty and confounding tumult of preferences and 
politics”.64 But with war crimes trials, conflicts of all kinds – moral, political and ethno 
cultural – are not simply ended. In fact, as is usually the case in such trials, they are drawn out 
over a course of years.
65
 
Applied in the context of Case 001, Shklar’s critique helps explain why the ECCC’s 
trial process may have externalized justice away from the Civil parties who came forward to 
give testimony.  Premised on notions of collective justice, the court assumed that “general 
categories correspond to essences which define individual phenomena and designate their 
place and purpose in a universal order”16. But bypassing the individual ‘politics’ of survivors 
by clothing them with a singular legal identity – that of the victim ‘Civil Party’ –  hardly 
papers over the conflicts that have emerged between them and the court, and the survivors 
inter se : conflicts  between the individual needs of victims and the requirements of collective 
justice.  
International(ized) war crimes courts like the ECCC, much like their domestic 
brethren, subscribe to the mantra that “all politics must be assimilated to the paradigm of 
[...] the judicial process.”66 In other words, their individuality of experience has been 
diminished by the aggregation of survivor identities by the ECCC and the prospect of the 
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continued collectivization of justice. After all, Civil parties rarely speak with one voice and 
have different extra-legal identities, perspectives, means of experiencing catharsis, and 
desires for vindication.   
As Shklar notes, “the policies of justice must constantly compromise with other 
social demands,”67 particularly since “the inevitable diversity among people and the 
complexity of the demands that a highly developed culture makes upon them [...] creates a 
multiplicity of needs and values” which chafe against “the uncompromising character of 
justice.”68    
The ECCC’s affiliates should appreciate that the society of Cambodian survivors is 
heterogeneous one and seek to make space for such “pluralism” of view-points and 
narratives, both inside and outside the court-room. They should take note that pluralism, as 
Shklar posits, “is [...] a social actuality that no contemporary political theory can ignore 
without losing its relevance, and also something that any liberal should rejoice in and seek 
to promote”69.  
Diane Marie Aman reminds us that for the law to have expressive value, the “message 
understood, rather than the message intended, is critical.”70 The message that many Civil 
parties seem to express in Case 001 is that theirs is a token role. Peter Macguire states that the 
civil party process, for all its promise, lacks any empirical basis: “I would put [the process] 
this under the category of therapeutic legalism. This is an invention of the 1990s, where 
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people freighted the trials with all this baggage.”71 We tend to agree. Let us be clear. We do 
not assert that war crimes trials ought to do less for victims; but must be cognizant that non-
judicial measures and options can, if properly operationalized, potentially do more for them.    
As Shklar points out, a critique of legalism does not “diminish the value of legalistic 
ethics or of legal institutions. To show that justice has its practical and ideological limits is 
not to slight it.”72  In fact, deeply aware of the various politics underlying such legal 
processes, Shklar believes that the ECCC’s forerunner, the Nuremburg trials had “enormous 
social value as an expression of legalistic politics on an occasion when it was most 
needed.”73 In her view: (t)he political advantages of a trial that replaces the anarchic cycle 
of vengeance need hardly be belaboured; they have been well known since the days of 
Aeschylus.”74 
Viewing ‘justice’ teleologically, instead of deontologically as lawyers tend to do, 
Shklar sees legalism not as an ideology, but as a continuum, with different “degrees of 
legalism”53 applicable to different conditions. According to Shklar, “[l]aw as a political 
instrument can play its most significant part in societies in which open group conflicts are 
accepted and which are sufficiently stable to be able to absorb and settle them in terms of 
rules.’75    
Shklar herself is silent on what these conditions might be, and when and how 
societies may come to accept violent conflict and legal accountability institutions that are 
devised to come to terms with them. We feel a great deal more normative research should 
go into helping to fill this intellectual lacuna, lest therapeutic legalism be falsely 
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championed, regardless of their pretentious promises to deliver catharsis through the law 
alone.  
NON-JUDICIAL ARENA 
Despite the grandiose promises of empowerment, reconciliation and justice made by the 
ECCC to victims, some civil parties emerged from the first trial more harmed than helped. 
The civil parties, unprepared for interrogatory litigation, were required to focus upon past 
events in isolation from their current troubles. In the pursuit of justice, legal requirements 
ended up bypassing the individuality of the victims, including their needs as traumatised 
persons. The ECCC should not have promised more than it can deliver. Legal accountability 
processes often buckle under the strain of supporting therapeutic goals. The ECCC and other 
accountability processes should instead abide by their foundational goal of delivering 
accountability under the law. To ask more of it than that, may be asking too much of any 
criminal trial.  
Restorative justice may better reside with parallel transitional justice processes that 
can be more receptive to strategies that commemorate victims in the non-judicial arena using 
pre-existing traditions that are communicated in a manner that resonates with victims. The 
instinctive response from lawyers is to equate the non-judicial arena with and effort to 
provide reparations. In the ECCC, reparations are not a “non-judicial” measure per se but are 
part of the newly updated Internal Rules of the Court. This makes it an integral component of 
the legal process in the ECCC. According to Rule 23bis (1), a Civil Party applicant will be 
able to make a claim for “collective and moral reparation if he or she has suffered physical, 
material or psychological injury.”76 Some examples of reparations requested to the ECCC by 
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civil parties include access for S-21 victims to free medical care, including psychological 
assistance, initiatives to educate Cambodian society concerning gross human rights abuses, 
genocide and crimes against humanity, the erection of public memorials and pagodas in the 
local communities of the Civil parties, and a full and frank disclosure of the assets in the 
name of the defendant.
77
  
At the largest civil parties’ conference organized by the Centre for Social 
Development in Phnom Penh in 2009, the two biggest demands of the civil parties were an 
accurate depiction of the crimes they had suffered and reparations. The main form of 
reparation ordered by the court in Duch’s case - a publication and dissemination of the 
court’s judgment is a far cry from the sort of reparations we have come to expect from 
international courts. If the ECCC did not want the civil parties’ views to be sidelined, why 
then were their calls for reparations not answered in the judgment of Case 001? 
The Chamber acknowledged in its Final Judgment that it is constrained in its task and 
that the type of reparations permitted under its Internal Rules are limited; “limitations of this 
nature cannot be circumvented through jurisprudence but instead require Rule amendments.
78
 
At the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for instance, governments have been ordered 
to ensure that each civil party receives a copy of the judgment in their native language; 
establish trust funds for education or medical treatment; hold commemoration ceremonies to 
honour victims; provide security to victims; and investigate related contemporary human 
rights abuses.
79
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The ECCC should take this into account for the upcoming trials or risk alienating 
significant portions of the civil parties who look to the court for reparations. Mark Drumbl 
highlights that the “de jure and de facto primacy of criminal courts may not reflect what 
societies under reconstruction actually want.”80 Victims seek diverse remedies and some lie 
beyond incarceration. Reparations go a long way in restorative justice by not only alleviating 
the economic situation of the victims, but at a collective level, pagodas and the building of 
memorials contribute to the discourse on social memory and aid in the post-conflict healing 
process. 
We suggest that the ECCC explore the non-judicial arena when considering victim-
oriented measures premised on restorative justice, regardless of how alien that may seem to 
lawyers. The following non-judicial initiatives which run or will run parallel to the ECCC’s 
trials give us confidence that restorative justice can be meted outside the courtroom at a 
spiritual ceremony or ritual, through testimonial therapy, on a dramatic stage or through the 
arts. 
First, we should look toward local and communal approaches to transitional justice. 
every year around late September to early October, Cambodians mark fifteen days in their 
calendars beginning with Kan Ben on the first day and ending with Pchum Ben on the 
fifteenth day. Sticky rice balls are a central feature of the ritual and are prepared in large 
numbers to be scattered across temple grounds for the spirits. This annual ceremony is a way 
for the souls of the dead to be honoured, fed, remembered (through local ritual means) and 
allows the living to assist to re-enter the cycle of life and death and ultimately, to reincarnate. 
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Now, with the advent of the ECCC, which has elicited and stirred memories, the time is ripe 
for a “special Pchum Ben.”  
According to an expert, Ly Daravuth, many Cambodian victims “can only start down 
the path toward healing, accepting, forgiving and reconciling only after this ‘initial duty’ has 
been fulfilled…The impulse of the Pchum Ben is one of rebuilding and re-gathering, rather 
than dividing, separating, and scattering. Living and deeply rooted in Cambodian society, it 
draws its strength from the religious and spiritual strata.”81 This spiritual ritual should not be 
eschewed from the consideration of UN officials and judges who do not, and may not care to, 
appreciate the immediacy and resonance it holds to the survivors in whose name they seek to 
administer justice. 
Second, investigation and documentation of alleged mass atrocities can be led by 
formal or informal truth and reconciliation commissions and referenda, by existing NGOs or 
others established for such purposes, or by researchers at academic and documentation 
institutions dedicated to contemporaneous data collection and analysis. It has been our 
experience that where effective formal judicial accountability mechanisms are not possible, 
justice processes devoted to truth and reconciliation can nonetheless provide a foundation for 
future accountability, not to mention strengthen local legal capacity and justice institutions 
which maintain the rule of law.  
The Kraing Meas, for instance, is an almost mythical Buddhist sacred book written on 
parchment and folded accordion-style and bound between wooden covers and kept in 
monastery libraries. It is said to contain the life stories of every person ever to be born. 
Conceptualized as a ‘Victim’s Register’, this should be re-created by the ECCC and 
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Cambodian civil society that will include the names, birth years and narrative accounts of 
victims, in written form, and recorded in audio-visual format that can be digitized for 
preservation and access. 
Third, it is critical to note that stories of survival matter. The Documentation Centre 
of Cambodia (DC-CAM) was established to conduct research, documentation and training on 
the Khmer Rouge Regime. DC-CAM and the Tuol Sleng Museum serve as the principal 
sources of evidentiary material for the ECCC. Nevertheless, despite the best efforts of 
archives and libraries in Cambodia and elsewhere, over the years much evidence of and 
witnesses to the Cambodian ‘killing fields’ have been destroyed, disappeared or perished and 
unfortunately will not form part of Cambodia’s historical record.  For survivors of mass 
violence who have now come forward to give evidence, there needs to be a repository of their 
important narratives and aspirations may become the only formal acknowledgment they will 
receive of the atrocities they endured under the Khmer Rouge regime. Individual stories, 
which are another part of justice and the healing process, can potentially reach a broad 
audience and thus facilitate reconciliation in a manner that legal proceedings cannot.  
Keeping this in mind, the ECCC Victims’ Unit had made a proposal to create a 
Victims Register to to complement the formal participation of victims in the judicial process 
before the ECCC. In order to provide some recognition to victims, the Victims’ Register is 
expected to collect and compile complete testimonies and victim stories together with a system 
of audiovisual recording.
82
 In a comprehensive population-based survey by the Berkeley 
Human Rights Centre on Cambodians’ attitudes about social reconstruction and the ECCC, 
entitled “So We Will Never Forget,” the locals’ opinions and attitudes about accountability 
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and justice were rightly captured. 
83
 The survey results suggest that 43% of the respondents 
expect justice to mean the revealing or establishing of the truth behind the atrocities.
84
 64.3 % 
of the respondents said that they would not be able to reconcile without such knowledge.
85
 
Quite evidently, a significant majority of locals expect a truth-seeking process to be 
established by the ECCC.  
The Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (“CHRAC”) and Redress laud this 
proposal of a Victims’ Register as an important legacy project for the court with the 
“possibility to create the basis for other measures for the benefit of victims, such as a 
documentary and audiovisual archive, memorialisation, commemorative services and truth-
seeking initiatives.
86
 
Justice in the wake of mass atrocity is not synonymous with prosecution. The 
alternatives to international prosecution need not be impunity, but rather other mechanisms of 
accountability better able to meet the goals that international prosecution cannot. National 
prosecutions, truth commissions, independent investigations, textbook revisions, lustration, 
banishment, political isolation, fines, sanctions, and civil damages are just a few of the other 
means to establish and respond to responsibility for violations of international humanitarian 
law.
87
  
The ECCC, its donors and power-brokers should supplement trials with non-judicial 
mechanisms and measures to address the objectives for which prosecution all too often falls 
short. Enormous resources devoted to running the ECCC can, and should, be diverted to 
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lustration, the production of documentaries, theatre plays, film-making, literature, school 
textbooks, photography and historical research that archives life stories during the Khmer 
Rouge regime.  
CONCLUSION 
 
As the proceedings in Case 001 have shown, the judicial arena is hardly an ideal space 
for victims to deal with or vindicate their traumatic history.  The adversarial nature of the 
legal process, coupled with the Court’s single-minded focus on securing the legal evidence 
necessary to establish criminal accountability can end up being more injurious to victims than 
it is curative.  
Given the inflated rhetoric surrounding the ECCC, there is a risk that promises will 
outstrip reality, leaving violations of international humanitarian law inadequately addressed 
by institutions only partially suited to the task. This is made worse by the fact that the ECCC 
is floundering: it did has not put in place a completion strategy at the outset of the trials as to 
what it would do after its original 3-year mandate came to an end and its US $90 mn budget 
ran out, as is now the case . In view of the cognitive dissonance between the ECCC’s rhetoric 
and the reality, it is wise to heed Hannah Arendt’s call that a war crimes tribunal like the 
ECCC should never promise more than it can deliver.
88
 The society in whose name the ECCC 
is trying the Khmer Rouge is multi-tiered, with each exerting a varying demand for justice 
upon the tribunal.  
It is high time that the ECCC move away from its monochromatic vision of 
accountability and undertake a rigorous self-examination. Only then would it be possible to 
engage with a robust array of mechanisms, both judicial and non-judicial, in the interests of 
survivors.  
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The ECCC must transcend its rhetorical promises of accountability and equitable 
justice and must tailor its approach to suit victims’ desires for vindication, reconciliation and 
closure by exploring innovative measures. After all, as Director of the Documentation Centre 
of Cambodia (DC-CAM) and Cambodian survivor Youk Chhang notes, “Even if the word 
justice is defined in different ways, from human rights groups to the government, for the 
victims... I think the issue is how do we move on? The tribunal, to me, is the last solution to 
Cambodia’s genocide.” 89      
The Tribunal should not freight its trials with “therapeutic legalism” when the judicial 
process alone cannot deliver its promise of peace and reconciliation. The privileging of the 
law must not suppress or unnecessarily delay the development of non-legal narratives and 
processes to complement the legal process.
90
 By not channelling all of our resources on 
prosecution alone, we will be able devote our resources on other forms of powerful 
transitional justice measures, such as theatre, archiving and film-making which more 
effectively tell the victim’s stories.  
Accountability and justice are complex ideas in post-conflict places with transitional 
justice. As the rubric of international norms of justice penetrate the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 
the ECCC must ensure that the core principles of justice would not be “subjugated to the 
vagaries of realpolitik” within Cambodia.91 The real beneficiaries of the ECCC’s work 
should be the Cambodians.
92
 Otherwise, the court risks alienating victims by embarking on a 
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grandiose search for international standards of justice, which may not necessarily sit well 
with the Cambodian people.
 93
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